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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 09-2056 
____________ 
 
MARCY NAPIER,  
 
                             Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF NEW CASTLE; ANTHONY LAGNESE;  
CHRISTOPHER BOUYE; JOHN DOE 1-10 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 06-cv-01368) 
District Judge:  Honorable Gary L. Lancaster 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 22, 2010 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, GREENAWAY, JR. and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: October 28, 2010) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Marcy Napier appeals an order of the District Court entering judgment against her. 
 She contends that the District Court erred twice: first, by granting a motion to dismiss her 
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§ 1983 and state law claims for abuse of process; and second, by granting a motion for 
summary judgment on her § 1983 and state law claims for malicious prosecution.  Largely 
for the reasons stated by the District Court, we will affirm. 
I. 
 Because we write for the parties, we recount only the facts and procedural history 
necessary to our decision.
1
 
 On June 17, 2004, Anthony Lagnese and Christopher Bouye, officers in the 
narcotics unit of the City of New Castle Police Department, met with a confidential 
informant (CI), who had previously provided reliable information.  The CI informed them 
that he could buy drugs from a “Marie Napier” or “Marcy Napier”2 and a “Michael 
Buxton,” so they set out to stage the drug buys.  Lagnese positioned himself to see the 
transaction, while Bouye was positioned to see Lagnese, but not the sellers.  Lagnese then 
observed the CI purchase $60.00 worth of crack cocaine from two women. 
 Lagnese later examined the Pennsylvania driver‟s license identification 
                                                 
1
 Although Napier appeals from both a motion to dismiss and a motion for 
summary judgment, the differences between the facts considered at the motion to dismiss 
stage (drawn from Napier‟s complaint and undisputed documents) and those considered 
at the summary judgment stage (drawn from the complete record viewed in the light most 
favorable to Napier) were not germane to the District Court‟s decisions at each stage. 
 
2
 The police report indicates the name “Marie Napier,” Bouye testified that the CI 
gave the name “Marcy Napier,” and Lagnese testified that the CI gave both names.  This 
initial confusion about the names, however, did not substantially impact the subsequent 
identification and probable cause issues underlying Napier‟s claims. 
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photographs of Marcy Napier and determined that they resembled one of the women he 
had seen selling drugs to the CI, a woman whom the CI had identified as Marie or Marcy 
Napier.  Therefore, Bouye and Lagnese filed criminal charges against Napier.  On 
October 1, 2004, three and one-half months after the buy, Napier was arrested at her 
home.  Lagnese observed the arrest and noticed that Napier looked different from his 
memory of the woman he had observed selling drugs.  Specifically, he believed that her 
hair style and weight were different.  He told Bouye about his observations, and they 
discussed the possibility that such changes in appearance could occur in three and one-
half months.  Following her arrest, Napier was taken to the Lawrence County Jail, strip 
searched, photographed, and held for three days. 
 Napier‟s preliminary hearing was originally scheduled for October 7, 2004, but it 
was continued by the district attorney.  The hearing was subsequently continued three 
more times, while Napier‟s defense counsel and the district attorney discussed the 
possibility of Napier submitting to a polygraph test.  Napier finally took and passed the 
polygraph test on March 15, 2005. 
 Napier alleges that after the polygraph test, she had a meeting with Bouye and 
Lagnese.  Lagnese confirms that they spoke; Bouye denies that the meeting ever took 
place.  Both officers disagree with Napier as to the substance of the discussion.  
According to Napier, Bouye apologized and told her that Lagnese knew, at the time of the 
arrest, that she was not the person he had observed selling drugs.  Napier testified: 
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He said -- Lagnese was sitting there; Bouye is standing up, pacing.  
He says: Marcy sit down.  Can I please have a moment of your time?  I said: 
Sure.  He says: Marcy, I don‟t know what happened.  He said: This has 
never happened to me before.  I have to tell you what happened. 
He says: The day of your arrest -- he said: Marcy, Lagnese was out 
there in front of your house while they brought you out in handcuffs.  He 
looked at your face and realized you weren‟t the girl that he ID‟d . . . two 
months before.  Those were his exact words. 
I said: Why didn‟t he speak up and say something?  He could have 
kept me from going to jail.  My neighbors are out there screaming.  I‟m 
crying, telling them that they have the wrong person.  Half of the other 
cops, they were boggled too, because they knew me.  They‟re like: Marcy, 
what‟s going on? 
So he said that Lagnese stood there: realized I wasn‟t the girl.  I said: 
Why did he do that?  He said: Well, he didn‟t know.  I thought maybe he 
just didn‟t want to look embarrassed in front of his peers by admitting he 
had the wrong person. 
 
App. 205-06.  The district attorney subsequently withdrew the charges against Napier. 
 On October 12, 2006, Napier filed a complaint in federal district court against the 
Appellees, alleging nine state and federal causes of action.  After Appellees moved for 
dismissal or summary judgment on all the claims, the Magistrate Judge filed a Report and 
Recommendation, recommending that: (1) the claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, 
assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy be 
dismissed on statute of limitations grounds; (2) the state law claims for negligence and 
malicious prosecution, against the City, be dismissed pursuant to Pennsylvania‟s Political 
Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8241, et seq.; and (3) the claim for 
abuse of process be dismissed for failure to state a claim.  Nevertheless, the Magistrate 
Judge recommended that the § 1983 malicious prosecution claim against all Appellees 
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and the state law malicious prosecution claim against the officers not be dismissed.  The 
District Court adopted the Report and Recommendation as the Opinion of the Court.  
Napier v. City of New Castle, et al., C.A. No. 06-1368, 2007 WL 1965296 (W.D. Pa. July 
3, 2007).  After discovery, Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment on the 
remaining malicious prosecution claims, which was granted in a second Report and 
Recommendation, which also was adopted by the District Court.  Napier v. City of New 
Castle, et al., C.A. No. 06-1368, 2009 WL 742688 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2009). 
II. 
A. 
 Napier appeals the dismissal of her abuse of process claims.  We review de novo a 
District Court‟s judgment granting a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).  
Ballentine v. United States, 486 F.3d 806, 808 (3d Cir. 2007).
3
 
 An abuse of process occurs when a party employs legal process against another 
primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it was not designed.  Gen. Refractories Co. 
v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 297, 307 (3d Cir. 2003).  “In contrast to a section 
1983 claim for malicious prosecution, a section 1983 claim for malicious abuse of process 
lies where „prosecution is initiated legitimately and thereafter is used for a purpose other 
                                                 
3
 Napier argues that the abuse of process claims should not have been dismissed on 
statute of limitations grounds, but the District Court opinion actually dismissed them for 
failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).  Napier, 2007 WL 1965296, at *5-6 (W.D. 
Pa. July 3, 2007). 
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than that intended by the law.‟”  Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 350 n.17 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(quoting Jennings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d 1213, 1217 (3d Cir. 1977)).  Pennsylvania 
recognizes a cause of action for abuse of process where “the defendant (1) used a legal 
process against the plaintiff, (2) primarily to accomplish a purpose for which the process 
was not designed; and (3) harm has been caused to the plaintiff.”  Rosen v. Am. Bank of 
Rolla, 627 A.2d 190, 192 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).  “„[T]here is no action for abuse of 
process when the process is used for the purpose for which it is intended, but there is an 
incidental motive of spite or an ulterior purpose of benefit to the defendant.‟”  Id. 
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 cmt. b (1977)). 
 As the District Court correctly determined, Napier‟s abuse of process claim alleged 
that the officers filed criminal charges and arrested her to avoid embarrassment and to 
conceal the fact that they were unsure they had identified the right person.  All of 
Napier‟s complained-of injuries occurred in connection with the initial charge and arrest.  
But the initial filing of criminal charges and her arrest, if improper, would constitute 
malicious prosecution, not abuse of process.  See Rose, 871 F.2d at 350 n.17.  Unlike her 
original complaint, Napier now argues that “it is the subsequent acts after the filing and 
not the institution of a criminal proceeding which gives rise to the tort of abuse of 
process” and that “throughout each stage of the proceedings, the Appellees continued the 
prosecution against Appellant Napier even though they knew they had arrested the wrong 
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person.”  Appellant‟s Br. 19, 21.4  As the District Court recognized, however, “„there is 
no liability where the defendant has done nothing more than carry out the process to its 
authorized conclusion, even though with bad intentions.‟”  Napier, 2007 WL 1965296 *6 
(W.D. Pa. July 3, 2007) (quoting Evans v. Durham Life Insurance Co., 2001 WL 770803 
*2 (E.D. Pa. 2001)). 
 Accordingly, the District Court did not err when it dismissed Napier‟s claims for 
abuse of process. 
B. 
 Napier also appeals the District Court‟s summary judgment on her malicious 
prosecution claims.  We review a summary judgment de novo.  Lexington Ins. Co. v. W. 
Pa. Hosp., 423 F.3d 318, 322 n.2 (3d Cir. 2005).  We “apply the same test required of the 
district court” and view inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party.  Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d 
Cir. 1995). 
 A claim of malicious prosecution under § 1983 requires, inter alia, that the 
proceeding was initiated without probable cause.  Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 
497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003).   Similarly, in Pennsylvania, “[i]n order to sustain a cause of 
action for malicious prosecution relating to a criminal prosecution, the plaintiff must 
                                                 
4
 Not only was this claim not a part of Napier‟s original complaint, there is no 
record evidence of which party sought or obtained the multiple continuances. 
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prove that the defendant (1) instituted proceedings against the plaintiff, (2) without 
probable cause, (3) with malice, and (4) that the proceedings were terminated in favor of 
the plaintiff.”  Corrigan v. Cent. Tax Bureau of Pa., Inc., 828 A.2d 502, 505 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2003) (citing Turano v. Hunt, 631 A.2d 822, 824 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993)). 
 As the District Court recognized, in this case both causes of action turn on whether 
probable cause existed to initiate proceedings against Napier.  Probable cause for 
purposes of malicious prosecution actions has been defined as: “reasonable ground of 
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficient to warrant an ordinary prudent man in the 
same situation in believing that the party is guilty of the offense.”  Thomas v. E.J. 
Korvette, Inc., 476 F.2d 471, 474 (3d Cir. 1973).  An arrest was made with probable 
cause if “at the moment the arrest was made . . . the facts and circumstances within [the 
officers‟] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were 
sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that [the suspect] had committed or was 
committing an offense.”  Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).  The inquiry is an 
objective one, and “an arresting officer‟s state of mind (except for the facts that he 
knows) is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause.”  Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 
146, 153 (2004). 
 Napier tries to minimize the importance of probable cause for her arrest, stating 
that “[i]n this case, the issue of probable cause for the arrest of Appellant is not of 
concern,”  Appellant‟s Br. at 23, presumably because the record evidence shows that 
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probable cause existed.  Because the lack of probable cause is an element of a malicious 
prosecution claim, the existence of probable cause for the arrest invalidates that claim.  
Estate of Smith, 318 F.3d at 522; Strickland v. University of Scranton, 700 A.2d 979, 984 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).  At the time of the arrest, Lagnese knew that Napier had been 
identified by the CI, that he had witnessed a woman selling drugs who looked like 
Napier‟s driver‟s license photograph, that Napier resembled the woman he had seen 
selling drugs—albeit with a different hairstyle and weight—and that it had been three and 
one-half months since he observed the woman selling drugs.  Regardless of whether 
Lagnese subjectively suspected that Napier was not the woman he had observed selling 
drugs, these circumstances are sufficient for a reasonable officer to believe that Napier 
was guilty of the offense, and therefore establish probable cause for the arrest.
5
 
 Napier responds that even though there was probable cause for the arrest, the 
officers can be found liable for malicious prosecution if they “„knowingly or with 
reckless disregard for the truth concealed exculpatory evidence from or provided false or 
misleading reports to the prosecutor or otherwise interfered with the prosecutor‟s ability 
to exercise independent judgment.‟”  Appellant‟s Br. 23 (quoting Vassallo v. Timoney, 
                                                 
5
 Other record evidence—including Napier‟s testimony that her driver‟s license 
photograph resembled a known local drug dealer, and Napier‟s sister‟s testimony that the 
photograph resembled a different known local drug dealer—was not known to Lagnese at 
the time, and therefore does not contribute to or detract from the reasonableness of his 
belief.  But it does potentially explain any error of identification on his part. 
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2001 WL 1243517, at *7 n.8 (E.D. Pa. Oct 15, 2001).  Napier‟s reliance on Vassallo is 
misplaced.  Like Vassallo, where the court found no malicious prosecution because there 
was no evidence that the defendant police officers had withheld exculpatory evidence 
from the prosecutor, there is no record evidence showing that Appellees withheld 
exculpatory evidence from or provided false or misleading reports to the district attorney. 
 Napier argues that Lagnese and Bouye should have informed the district attorney of the 
differences in appearance noted by Lagnese at the time of her arrest.  Napier characterizes 
this information as Lagnese‟s knowledge “on the day of the arrest that Appellant Napier 
was not the same person who participated in the drug buy.”  Appellant‟s Br. 24.  But the 
record simply indicates that Lagnese noted differences in appearance, which is, in the 
words of the District Court, “not the equivalent of knowing that Napier was not the 
woman who engaged in the drug buy.”  Napier, 2009 WL 742688, at *5.6  Not informing 
the district attorney of a momentary doubt, which had been subsequently dispelled and 
which did not eliminate the probable cause for the arrest, cannot constitute knowingly or 
with reckless disregard for the truth concealing exculpatory evidence from the prosecutor 
                                                 
6
 The only record evidence even suggesting that Lagnese “knew” that Napier was 
the wrong person is Napier‟s own, ambiguous deposition testimony that Bouye told her 
that Lagnese had told him that “[h]e looked at your face and realized you weren‟t the girl 
that he ID‟d.”  App. 206.  The District Court rightly notes that this self-serving testimony 
as to information of which Napier had no direct knowledge cannot create a material issue 
of fact that allows this case to survive summary judgment.  Napier, 2009 WL 742688, at 
*6 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 
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or otherwise interfering with the prosecutor‟s ability to exercise independent judgment.  
In sum, because Napier cannot establish that the proceedings lacked probable cause when 
initiated, she cannot maintain a claim for wrongful prosecution. 
III. 
 Finally, Napier argues that the City of New Castle should be held liable because 
the officers were acting pursuant to a city custom or policy.  See Monell v. Dept. of Soc. 
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).  However, because the District Court correctly found that 
there was no constitutional violation for which the officers were liable under § 1983, the 
City cannot be held vicariously liable.  See, e.g., Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, Pa., 
891 F.2d 458, 467 (3d Cir. 1989). 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we find that the District Court did not err in dismissing 
Napier‟s claims for abuse of process or in granting summary judgment as to her claims of 
malicious prosecution.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
                                                                                                                                                             
934 F.2d 497, 500 (3d Cir. 1991); Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 608 (3d 
Cir. 2002)). 
